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The Political Economy of Myanmar’s
Transition
LEE JONES
School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT Since holding elections in 2010, Myanmar has transitioned from a direct military
dictatorship to a formally democratic system and has embarked on a period of rapid economic
reform. After two decades of military rule, the pace of change has startled almost everyone and led
to a great deal of cautious optimism. To make sense of the transition and assess the case for
optimism, this article explores the political economy of Myanmar’s dual transition from state
socialism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy. It analyses changes within Myanmar
society from a critical political economy perspective in order to both situate these developments
within broader regional trends and to evaluate the country’s current trajectory. In particular, the
emergence of state-mediated capitalism and politico-business complexes in Myanmar’s borderlands
are emphasised. These dynamics, which have empowered a narrow oligarchy, are less likely to be
undone by the reform process than to fundamentally shape the contours of reform. Consequently,
Myanmar’s future may not be unlike those of other Southeast Asian states that have experienced
similar developmental trajectories.
KEY WORDS: Myanmar, Burma, political economy, reform, democratisation, Murdoch School
In 2010, the first elections were held in Myanmar after 22 years of direct military rule.
Most Western observers had decided in advance that the polls would be a travesty. The
regime had been sanctioned and isolated following its refusal to transfer power to the
winner of elections held in 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung
San Suu Kyi. Instead the regime had pursued its own, visibly flawed “roadmap to
democracy.” The 2008 constitution was largely designed by the military and was imposed
through an implausible “referendum” – a 93.8% “yes” vote on a 98% turnout – in the
middle of a major natural disaster, Cyclone Nargis. The NLD boycotted the 2010
elections, though smaller opposition parties did participate. Unsurprisingly, the military-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured approximately 60% of
the seats in both houses of parliament and captured all but one of the regional assemblies,
while the military took 25% of the seats in both national-level assemblies and one-third in
all the regional assemblies, as mandated by the constitution. Little change was expected
from what appeared to be a purely superficial exercise.
Yet, one year later, major reform was underway. The NLD had triumphed in by-
elections in April 2012, bringing Aung San Suu Kyi into parliament. Peace talks had
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begun with ethnic-minority insurgents. Peaceful gatherings and trade unions had been
legalised. Internet censorship eased. The IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank
(ADB) were advising on a slew of economic reforms. Western observers now exhibit
considerable optimism about the country’s trajectory. Sanctions have been eased, and
foreign politicians and businesspeople are flocking to influence the process and secure
opportunities for themselves. The International Crisis Group (2012b) regards reform and
democratisation as irreversible, and the ADB (2012) suggests that Myanmar may be
Asia’s next rising star and become a middle-income country by 2030.
How far is optimism justified? How do we make sense of this reform process? And
what sort of state is Myanmar in the process of becoming? This article seeks to answer
these questions by considering the political economy and social power relations that
emerged under military rule and how these are conditioning the trajectory of reform. It
also seeks to situate Myanmar’s development within broader patterns of regional devel-
opment, using a critical political economy approach that has been applied to other
Southeast Asian states, and emphasises the dynamic changes within Myanmar over the
last two decades. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature. Many otherwise
excellent studies of Myanmar have little comparative sensibility, creating the impression
of a sui generis case. The focus on Myanmar’s unchanging military regime, with words
like “timewarp” and “stasis” frequently used, also tends to occlude deeper transformations
in state-society relations (Callahan 1998; Larkin 2012, 65).
The article is divided into four parts. The first indicates the analytical approach used
here, drawing on the “Murdoch school” of critical political economy, which foregrounds
social conflicts over power and resources in understanding the nature of state power in
Southeast Asia and emphasises the legacy of state-led development in shaping the region’s
political trajectories. The second and third parts of the article explore transformations in
Myanmar’s political economy which provide the context for the current reform period.
The second part considers the development of state-mediated capitalism in Myanmar,
exploring the fostering of a state-linked business class and crony capitalism, and the
emergent symbiosis between big business and the state. The third part considers the
transformation of centre-periphery relations since 1988 with the signing of ceasefires
with ethnic minority insurgents, the emergence of new politico-business complexes and
struggles to centralise these networks to enhance central state power.1 The fourth part
draws out the legacy of these developments for the current transition. It presents, for
heuristic purposes, an optimistic view that the power relations established over the last
two decades are being dismantled by the reform process. It then critiques this view,
showing how the managed nature of the transition and the state-business networks
established under military rule place broad structural constraints upon the reform process
as they struggle to shape it. It also considers, in a more speculative vein, whether
Myanmar’s future may be similar to Cambodia’s post-communist trajectory, arguing that
there are reasons for both pessimism and optimism.
The Political Economy of Transition
This section describes the analytical approach taken in this article, drawing on the
“Murdoch school” of critical political economy. This approach, based on a sophisticated
branch of Marxist state theory, emphasises how social conflicts over power and control
over resources shape the (trans)formation and exercise of state power. Whilst sensitive to
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the ideologies and strategies of socio-political forces, it underscores the structural con-
straints on states emanating from political economy and social power relations. This
approach provides a useful perspective on transitions from dictatorship to democracy
and from socialism to capitalism, focusing on the struggles between key social groups
over the direction and spoils of “reform.” This approach, which has been applied to most
Southeast Asian states, also helps to situate analogous developments in Myanmar within
broader patterns of regional development.
The “Murdoch school” refers to a group of scholars associated with the Asia Research
Centre of Perth’s Murdoch University who have produced definitive surveys of the
political economy of Southeast Asia (Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 2006b). Their
work is grounded in a branch of Marxist state theory associated with the work of
Poulantzas (1976) and Jessop (2008). This approach argues that states should be viewed
not primarily as sets of institutions – though, of course, these do exist – but as an
expression of social power relations. States are seen as being produced, transformed
and constrained by conflicts between social forces, particularly classes and class fractions
but also ethnic, religious and other groups, as they struggle for power and control over
resources. Political outcomes do not simply express policy choices or institutional design,
but are conditioned by the structural influence of powerful social forces which enjoy
privileged access to state apparatuses and can mould their operation to suit their own
interests. “A particular regime, therefore, cannot be understood separately from the
structure of social power and conflict and specific class interests.” (Hewison, Robison,
and Rodan 1993, 18).
This approach is useful for analysing transition and reform because it avoids an undue
emphasis on policy or institutional factors and underscores how, despite changes in state
institutions and policies, the transformation and operation of the state continues to be
shaped by processes of social conflict (Sangmpan 2007). Reform will not simply succeed
if the right policies or institutions are put in place, because even “good” institutions
remain subject to broader social power relations. Democratic, economic and institutional
reforms have been pursued in Southeast Asia for many years, and apparently without
dramatically changing the principal beneficiaries of state power. The Murdoch school
attributes this to the legacy of Cold War struggles and strategies which saw states foster
the emergence of powerful business classes and state-dependent middle classes, whilst
working-class and radical middle-class forces were violently suppressed and forcibly
disorganised. Today, consequently, “one of the defining features of the political economy
of Southeast Asia ... is the highly instrumental nature of capitalist control of state power,”
often enabling politico-business elites to subvert or mould reform processes to suit their
own interests (Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 2006a, 25).
This approach has been used to analyse democratic transition and economic reform
elsewhere, offering important insights for understanding dynamics in Myanmar. In
Indonesia’s reformasi era, for example, Robison and Hadiz (2004) carefully document
how, following the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto, the oligarchy established
under the New Order used its structural power and influence to rescue their corporate
empires and capture emergent democratic state apparatuses. The monolithic Suharto-
centric patronage network gave way to a decentralised system of “money politics” in
which the interests of dominant business elites are still systematically privileged. Hadiz
(2010) further demonstrates how decentralisation reforms, which the World Bank pro-
moted to enhance popular accountability by localising decision making, were conditioned
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by social power relations. Despite reformers’ best intentions, lower-tier New Order elites
and emergent oligarchs were best placed in struggles to control the newly decentralised
apparatuses and, having largely captured them, used them to benefit themselves and their
corporate allies. Crucially, Robison and Hadiz (2004, 256) insist, Indonesia is not in
“transition” to something else: given the balance of social forces, “the essential new
patterns and dynamics of social, economic and political power have now been estab-
lished.” Indonesia has become an “oligarchic democracy.”
The Philippines has been subjected to similar analysis. The Marcos dictatorship was
toppled in 1986 by the mass action of workers, peasants and middle-class civil society
activists. However, because the socio-economic power of old landed oligarchs and newer
capitalist elites enabled them to capture Congress and shape the post-Marcos transition,
this none the less produced “the restoration of elite democracy” (Hutchison 2006, 57). The
new government’s ostensible commitment to pro-poor reforms, especially land reform,
produced few results as landholding elites thwarted the process. Although civil society
organisations gained a formal constitutional role in local government to promote poverty
alleviation, their fragmentation, and the broader weakness of the left in relation to
dominant forces, left them advising on and implementing narrow policies which leave
the structural causes of poverty untouched (Reid 2006). This constitutional innovation has
proven to be one among many examples of technocratic forms of political “participation”
that, rather than enabling proper state accountability to the masses, deliberately channel
popular involvement in directions unthreatening to dominant interests (Rodan and
Jayasuriya 2007).
The Murdoch school has also been useful in analysing transitions from socialism to
capitalism, which is particularly helpful in analysing the Myanmar case. In her study of
Cambodia, Hughes (2003) shows how the dismantling of the communist state from the
mid-1980s involved privatising assets to politico-bureaucratic elites and allied business
groups, which reorganised themselves into the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to contest
democratic elections overseen by the United Nations in 1993. Despite intense struggles
with former Western-backed exiles and remnants of the Khmer Rouge, the CPP retained
and enhanced its grip on state power thanks to its extensive patronage resources – rooted
in its control of Cambodia’s natural resources – and its close relationship to the military. A
massive UN-led state-building intervention plus two decades of reform and “good gov-
ernance” programmes from Western donors have not loosened CPP control. Opponents
are systematically excluded from defining the reform process, allowing the CPP to
channel it down safe lines (Hameiri 2010, ch. 7). Because Cambodia’s trajectory is a
particularly cautionary tale for Myanmar, we will return to this comparison later.
The Murdoch school thus provides a helpful lens for understanding the potentials and
constraints of Myanmar’s dual transition. It directs analytical attention to the distribution
of socio-economic power at the point of transition as potentially imposing major con-
straints on the process of political and economic transformation. Despite substantial
changes in formal institutions, dominant coalitions – even those faced with serious
obstacles – can often reorganise themselves and steer reform processes in their own
interests. The exact trajectory of “reform” is contingent on struggles between social forces
as they struggle to control these processes. To understand the political economic context
of Myanmar’s reform era, the following two sections analyse the power relations estab-
lished under military rule, focusing on the state-mediated transition to capitalism and the
formation of politico-business complexes in the borderlands.
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The Emergence of State-mediated Capitalism
One of the most important transformations in Myanmar since 1988 has been the con-
strained transition from state socialism to state-mediated capitalism. Much of the literature
criticises the military regime’s economic mismanagement, arguing that it produced only
“stagnation” and “crisis” (see, for example, Turnell 2011). The dominant interpretation is
that the state has remained dominant in the economy, deliberately preventing “the
emergence of a domestic commercial class of any significance” and “stifling change”
(Taylor 2001, 13). By contrast, this section argues that there has been considerable
change, albeit constrained by social factors and political strategies. The state has fostered
a re-emergent business class and created a layer of “crony capitalists” in an increasingly
symbiotic relationship with the state. Whilst this class did not yet wield direct political
power, unlike some of its Southeast Asian counterparts, by 2010 it had been positioned to
do so.
The context for Myanmar’s state-mediated transition to capitalism was the collapse of
the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) regime in 1988. Burma had experienced
communist and ethnic separatist insurgencies in its border regions virtually since inde-
pendence. These mounting challenges prompted the military to seize power in 1960. To
cultivate greater popular support for the Burmese state, the military regime – which later
created a one-party “socialist” state under the military-dominated BSPP – pursued
autarkic, state-led import-substitution industrialisation. For reasons common to many
developing countries – falling commodity export revenues and rising capital import and
debt servicing costs – this development model failed disastrously. By 1987, inflation and
unemployment were rampant, the economy was stagnant, and the state virtually bankrupt.
Faced with mass protests and demands for democratisation in 1988, in addition to ongoing
insurgencies, the sclerotic regime swiftly collapsed, prompting the army to resume direct
control as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). SLORC rapidly
adopted pro-market reforms to stave off total economic collapse, including opening
Myanmar to foreign investment, liberalising agriculture, timber extraction and fisheries,
and encouraging a shift to the private sector.
However, this shift was constrained by an important legacy of BSPP rule: the historic
weakness of Myanmar’s bourgeoisie. All internal trade was nationalised in 1963, prompt-
ing 300,000 South Asian business owners to emigrate and forcing the indigenous bour-
geoisie into the black market. Although by 1985 there were still 31,239 private
manufacturing firms compared with 1,763 State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and the
private sector still produced 55% of GDP, few private firms employed over 10 workers
(Taylor 2009, 346). By contrast, hundreds of thousands of people were employed by the
state and SEEs. Consequently, despite wishing to “wake up all the entrepreneurs,” the
minister of finance at the time feared that their lack of capital and management experience
would lead them simply to asset-strip SEEs, provoking further unrest among state
employees. Since a “fluent, responsible middle class” was absent, it was necessary for
the state to “build it up” (interview with D. Abel, former Minister of Finance and
Planning, July 6, 2012, Yangon). Privatisation would thus be gradual and directed to
create large-scale “national entrepreneurs” capable of taking on major industries.
The extent and pace of this process, however, was further shaped by struggles within
the regime and state, and by the regime’s political strategy. Conservative generals,
ministers and officials, particularly those connected with SEE-operating ministries,
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resisted rapid liberalisation, fearing a loss of revenues, rents and employment. Formal
state monopolies were retained or re-imposed in many tradable sectors and conservatives
channelled foreign investment towards rehabilitating or even establishing new SEEs.
Conservatives became dominant within the regime after 1997 when SLORC was sub-
stantially reorganised into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the
Trade Policy Council was established, imposing new restrictions on the private sector. The
SPDC’s political priority was to enhance the military’s strength vis-à-vis its internal
opponents and direct society in a managed transition to what the army called “disci-
pline-flourishing democracy” (Mya Maung 1998).
This shaped the liberalisation process in two ways. First, the army exploited it to
augment its own business holdings. It established two large conglomerates: Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, with interests in banking, trade, tourism and
precious stones, and Myanmar Economic Corporation, with interests in heavy industry
and commodities. Military-linked firms and SEEs also absorbed most foreign investment
in the 1990s, and could obtain foreign exchange at the absurdly low official rate, rather
than the black market rate. Secondly, the regime deliberately cultivated “national entre-
preneurs” who would support its goals. These factors constrained the privatisation process
and ensured that its principal beneficiaries would be those entrepreneurs who fostered
close, corrupt relations with powerful officials in order to obtain trade licences, construc-
tion contracts, joint venture deals and other lucrative opportunities.
After 1988, therefore, we see the state-mediated re-emergence of Myanmar’s bourgeoi-
sie. During the initial liberalisation period, many businesspeople with the right connec-
tions made small fortunes exporting timber, agricultural commodities and marine
products, giving them the capital to form construction firms to capitalise on a boom in
real estate and government infrastructure spending (Kudo 2005, 15–16). Public assets,
such as land and state hotels, were leased to private firms as the government promoted
tourism, and almost all of Myanmar’s largest firms today benefited from state construction
contracts. The state’s weak capacity to run SEEs also created further lucrative opportu-
nities. Even after state monopolies were re-imposed in tradable sectors, joint ventures
were signed with foreign and favoured domestic firms, which actually extracted natural
resources, such as oil and gas (Alamgir 2008, 991–994). Other monopolistic SEEs were
effectively subcontracted to private-sector management (interview with Khin Maung Nyo,
economist and former official in the Prime Minister’s Office, July 11, 2012, Yangon). The
state-run Myanmar Timber Enterprise, for example, had to engage private firms to fell
timber in remote areas, creating large profits and opportunities for illegal logging (inter-
view with Barber Cho, Joint General-Secretary, Myanmar Timber Merchants Association,
July 20, 2012, Yangon).
All this produced a significant shift in ownership and control towards the private sector.
Although most remained small scale compared to SEEs, the number of private sector
firms grew 50% from 1992–98. By 1998–89, the private sector accounted for 85% of
manufacturing output and three-quarters of GDP, with marked growth in trade, mining,
construction, finance and manufacturing (Myat Thein 2004, 125, 200–205, 251). Despite
sluggish privatisation, from 1989–2003 the number of SEEs fell 53% while private
businesses increased by 59%. By this time, despite heavy restrictions on trade licences
and foreign exchange and the state’s formal monopoly in tradable sectors, the private
sector’s share of exports exceeded the state’s by 11% and its share of imports by 37% (Tin
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Maung Maung Than 2005, 380, 389). By 2005–06 the state’s share of GDP had declined
to below 7% – down from 45% in 1985 (Taylor 2009, 455).
These headline figures occlude the concentration of benefits from this state-mediated
transition to capitalism. Aside from the military – including both military-owned firms
and individual officers and their family members who entered business, particularly
highly corrupt regional commanders – the principal beneficiaries were entrepreneurs
who secured the lion’s share of lucrative deals via their close relations with leading
generals. This term is applied, since virtually no significant enterprise could prosper
without close links to the regime. However, a smaller subset of around fifteen favoured
individuals – including Steven Law, Tay Za, Zaw Zaw, Kyaw Win, Thein Tun, Eike Htun,
Htay Myint and Aung Ko Win – were selected as “national entrepreneurs.” They were
systematically favoured by state patronage and now own Myanmar’s largest conglomer-
ates, with interests spanning banking, real estate, tourism, mining, timber, manufacturing,
construction, transport and telecommunications (Irrawaddy, June-August 2000). Although
no data exist on the scale of the “cronies’” dominance, many political and business leaders
interviewed suggested that they control a majority of the country’s wealth despite
comprising just 5% of businesses in absolute terms. The rest of the business class remains
predominantly small scale (Tin Maung Maung Than 2005, 380).
A second leading beneficiary was the Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA). Modelled on Golkar, the state party Suharto established in Indonesia, the USDA
was a mass organisation formed by SLORC in 1993 to promote local development,
supplement local governance and mobilise mass support for the regime. The USDA was
given control of several national markets and, at the regional level, extensive interests in
transportation, aquaculture, plantations, real estate and rice-milling (Steinberg 2001, 112).
These businesses became an important local patronage resource. This drew in many, while
others were coerced to join; by 2005, the USDA claimed 23 million members. In 2010, it
was converted into the USDP, winning the 2010 elections.
The relationship between the new business class and the state was very complex. On
the one hand, business elites clearly depended on state patronage, and the regime retained
means to keep them in line. This is best understood as the creation and manipulation of a
“limited access order,” whereby the economy is manipulated to create rents which are
selectively dispersed to non-state actors to buy their loyalty and encourage co-operation
(North et al. 2007).2 The retention of monopolies, trade and investment licences and
arbitrary regulations was not simply “mismanagement,” but a deliberate means to regulate
businesses’ access to resources. By manipulating access to permits or selectively enfor-
cing the law, the regime could exercise political control. For example, the secretary-
general of the Timber Merchants’ Association states that his members never dared to
criticise the regime in case their supplies of timber – a state monopoly – were severed
(interview with Barber Cho, July 20, 2012). Selective prosecutions for corruption or
money laundering were used to pick off certain individuals and keep others in line.
Cronies were played off against one another to maintain their loyalty, whilst non-cronies
faced barriers accessing permits and long delays in receiving payments owed by the
government (US Embassy 2009b, 2009d). Ironically, international economic sanctions, by
further constraining economic opportunities, enhanced this method of control by intensi-
fying business’s reliance on the state. The government also appointed the top officials of
the Union of Myanmar Federated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI),
curtailing its independence.
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However, the state also became dependent on powerful business interests, meaning that
the relationship was not entirely one-sided but rather symbiotic. This dependence reflected
the state’s persistent inability to raise and spend revenue effectively, itself rooted in the
regime’s widespread unpopularity, corruption and macroeconomic weaknesses. The state
relied on businesspeople for services ranging from the petty – such as transporting
merchants and merchandise to regional gems emporia – to the serious – such as busting
the Western arms embargo or brokering ceasefires with insurgent groups (US Embassy
2009a, 2009c). Private businesses were required to perform activities SEEs could not,
such as extracting timber or oil, winning them profit-sharing arrangements. Most visibly,
crony capitalists were frequently tasked with constructing infrastructure, such as roads,
dams and pipelines, and the new capital at Nay Pyi Taw. Major projects were often done
at a loss because the state could not pay, offering only import licences in compensation
(US Embassy 2008b). The regime’s dependence on business was most marked in the
wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 when the impoverished, paralysed state relied entirely on
individual cronies and Myanmar Egress, an NGO formed by leading magnates, to supply
aid and reconstruction assistance to the Irrawaddy delta, and to mediate with international
donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (US Embassy 2008a). Ahead of the
2010 elections, crony capitalists were also approached to run for parliament for (and
probably fund) the USDP, while Myanmar Egress trained and bankrolled opposition
parties willing to participate.
As Myanmar undergoes “democratic” transition, therefore, one cannot reasonably argue
that there remains no business class of real significance. The BSPP state’s dismantling –
albeit highly constrained in many ways – has fostered a state-linked oligarchic elite which
enjoys considerable economic dominance and close relations with military and state
officials. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, big business in Myanmar has been mediated
by the state. Given its very late, constrained development, it never became sufficiently
powerful to displace its military-bureaucratic patrons, as was the case in Indonesia,
Thailand and Malaysia during the 1980s-90s. None the less, with the military’s retreat
from direct political power, Myanmar’s crony capitalists are poised to exercise consider-
able influence over the trajectory of reform.
The Borderlands: Ceasefire Capitalism and Political Complexes
A second, related change since 1988 has been the transformation of relations between
forces associated with the central state and Myanmar’s ethnic-minority insurgent groups.
Through a series of ceasefire agreements, the SLORC/SPDC gradually pacified the border
regions and struck new compromises with local forces based on the pursuit of develop-
ment and business opportunities. State power in the borderlands is now constituted by
“emerging political complexes” between a range of social groups, including army com-
manders, state officials, militia leaders, religious figures and local and foreign investors.
Struggles over the flows and proceeds of an increasingly rapacious “ceasefire capitalism”
have, in some areas, favoured state-business nexuses at the national and international
level, weakening minority elites’ will and capacity to resist the central state.
By the 1960s, Myanmar was wracked by insurgencies as minority-ethnic groups
resisted incorporation into a unitary state dominated by the Bamar ethnic majority, instead
seeking autonomy or independence. Throughout the Cold War, virtually all of Myanmar’s
lengthy borders with China and Thailand were controlled by armed insurgents, backed by
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neighbouring states, who financed their campaigns through smuggling and opium-traf-
ficking. However, in 1988, just as Burma’s cities revolted, a major insurgent alliance
headed by the Communist Party of Burma collapsed after ethnic-minority forces under its
leadership mutinied. SLORC seized this opportunity, successfully negotiating ceasefires
with the war-weary splinter groups. This allowed the army to be concentrated against the
remaining insurgents, prompting a second round of ceasefires. The process was assisted
by Thailand and China, which shifted from supporting the insurgents to pushing them to
stand down so as to enable the exploitation of natural resources located in the borderlands
or the construction of trade and energy infrastructure. By the late 1990s, 17 ceasefires had
been concluded and only two significant groups remained in rebellion.
Because insurgent leaders signed the ceasefires largely out of a desire to rehabilitate
their conflict-ravaged, impoverished regions, post-ceasefire borderlands politics has been
dominated by developmental issues. Although ceasefire terms varied widely, they typi-
cally involved allowing insurgent groups to control some territory, resources and check-
points and to continue (for the time being) trafficking opium, while the government
supplied unprecedented healthcare, education and infrastructure investment. Army garri-
sons, the USDA and state apparatuses delivering new social services all entered the
borderlands for the first time. Regional army commanders, wielding considerable arbitrary
power, replicated central strategies, selectively dispensing licences, permits and business
opportunities. Ceasefire group leaders were co-opted into new patronage networks,
exploiting the natural resources they controlled with the aid of Thai and Chinese investors,
and becoming “subcontract[ors]” for the state in their domains (Taylor 2009, 450).
Increasingly rapacious frontier capitalism subsequently emerged around timber, pre-
cious metals and stones, gas, oil and hydropower, facilitated by foreign investment.3 The
alliances and accommodations forged around this which now constituted state power in
the borderlands. They are characterised by Callahan (2007, 3–4) as “‘emerging political
complexes’... flexible and adaptive networks that link state and other political authorities
to domestic and foreign business concerns (some legal, others illegal), traditional indi-
genous leaders, religious authorities, overseas refugee and diaspora communities, political
party leaders, and NGOs,” particularly the USDA. The principal beneficiaries of these
arrangements have been a narrow stratum of ethnic-minority elites, regional army com-
manders and national and foreign investors. Their monopolisation of rents has generated
growing popular resentment among minority populations, including towards their own
leaderships, which are generally highly authoritarian and illiberal. Popular grievance is
intensifying as land grabs, forced displacement and landlessness, associated particularly
with agribusiness development, mining and infrastructure development and typically
occurring with the connivance of state agencies, become increasingly commonplace
(Woods 2011, 765–767; TNI 2011). However, the dominance of these elite compacts
goes largely unchallenged by more progressive forces. The turn from politics to devel-
opment and the generally oppressive political climate have demobilised the old resistance
organisations and channelled “civil society” organisations towards apolitical “develop-
ment” activities, leaving most people with no collective political voice.
The regime’s strategy of co-opting borderlands leaders carried serious implications for
the development of Myanmar’s national political economy. Insurgent commanders,
including leading drugs barons, were encouraged to invest their proceeds from smuggling
in central Myanmar – after paying a 25% “whitening” tax. In exchange for mediating
several ceasefires, one of Asia’s most notorious drug barons, Lo Hsing Han, was allowed
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to use his capital to found AsiaWorld, which is now Myanmar’s largest conglomerate.
Run by Lo’s son, Steven Law, AsiaWorld was given lucrative government contracts and
privileged access to foreign investment. The USA reported that most Singaporean invest-
ment in the 1990s was linked to Lo’s family (The Nation, December 2, 1996). The equally
notorious Khun Sa also became a “national entrepreneur” as part of his “surrender” to the
government in 1996. The emergent private banking system became dominated by Sino-
Burmese “tycoons” closely linked to rebel groups, whose wealth stemmed from smug-
gling or opium trafficking (Turnell 2009, 260–265). Indeed, by the late 1990s, one analyst
observed that “the current Myanmar Business Directory of the Union of Myanmar
Chamber of Commerce and Industry reads like a who’s who in the drug trade.”
(Lintner 1998, 179).
As with other emergent crony capitalists, the relationship between these new business
elites and the state was symbiotic. The regime facilitated their rehabilitation and enrich-
ment and drew them into the “limited access order,” offering them patronage and
exemption from prosecution in exchange for their loyalty (Meehan 2011). But equally,
particularly in the 1990s, the emaciated state desperately needed the drug lords’ capital – a
dependency arguably intensified by international sanctions. As with other cronies, drugs
barons were also required to supplement government social and physical infrastructure
spending in the borderlands (Joyce 2002, 81). The legacy of this complex interdependence
is that criminal proceeds – and criminals – are firmly ensconced within Myanmar’s
modern economy.
Today, the borderlands’ “political complexes” are marked by dynamic struggles over
the flows and benefits of ceasefire capitalism, with more centralised networks of army
commanders and national and foreign investors becoming increasingly powerful vis-à-vis
local power-brokers in some areas. Initially, investments in natural resource extraction
favoured local headmen and ceasefire leaders who mediated the deals and “taxed”
commodities crossing “their” borders into Thailand and China. However, from the early
2000s, as the army’s presence strengthened, the state began re-routing Chinese trade and
investment through military-state channels by signing strategic deals with foreign inves-
tors, banning trade through certain border towns and redirecting it through Yangon. This
“increased state funds ... [and] – more importantly – cut off ethnic political resistance
groups’ access to resource rents ... resource extraction trading networks became connected
to the regime’s wider patron-client relations,” with power shifting from local headmen to
“regional and national military officials and Chinese businesspeople” and “national
entrepreneurs.” Similarly, emerging large-scale agribusiness became dominated by joint
ventures between regional army commanders, “national entrepreneurs” and Chinese
investors. Along the Chinese border, locals increasingly joined these more “centralised”
networks or were squeezed out (Woods 2011, 750–752, 765–767). Along the Thai border,
however, the presence of stronger ceasefire groups and competition between Thai and
Chinese investors has maintained a wider circle of beneficiaries, including ceasefire
groups like the United Wa State Army. This group retains some capacity to resist the
central state, albeit at the risk of becoming a “Chinese vassal state” (TNI 2011, 75). The
borderlands’ “emergent political complexes” remain very complex.
Overall, however, the will and capacity of insurgent groups to resist central state power
has clearly waned as a result of co-option, the re-routing of economic flows that sustained
earlier resistance and the army’s increased strength. A key test occurred in 2004–08 when
the National Convention (NC) – suspended since 1996 – was reconvened to draft a new
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constitution as part of the SPDC’s “roadmap to democracy.” In the 1990s, the NC was
abandoned because NLD and minority representatives resisted the regime’s plans. From
2004–08, although the process was far from smooth and ceasefire groups won some
concessions, most minority leaders saw little opportunity for resistance, preferring instead
to consolidate their economic gains via a new constitutional settlement (Smith 2007;
Kramer 2009). Prior to the 2010 elections, the state sought to convert ceasefire groups’
militias into “Border Guard Forces” (BGFs) under army control. Many consented while a
few larger groups resisted, some of them by force. However, most were now no match for
the Myanmar army – which had doubled in size since 1988 – and ceasefires quickly
followed. Although these ceasefires are fragile in several areas, particularly Shan state,
only the Kachin Independence Organisation and the far weaker Karen National Union
remain in open revolt. None the less, this armed resistance led the post-2010 government
to shelve the BGF idea and pursue negotiations for a more durable settlement.
These episodes illustrate the continued complexity of political and economic life in
Myanmar’s minority-ethnic states, which is shaped by complex, shifting alliances between
diverse actors struggling to control empowering economic flows. In some areas, the
accommodations forged around ceasefire capitalism, coupled with threatened or actual
coercion, have created increasingly durable power relations. However, they are typically
characterised by illiberal, authoritarian governance and widening socio-economic inequal-
ity. Elsewhere, these patterns are less stable, with peripheral groups retaining some
capacity to resist central agendas. These local power relations pose formidable challenges
for would-be reformers.
Myanmar in Transition: Prospects and Pitfalls
This section explores how the political economy relations analysed above may affect the
ongoing transition to market democracy and “reform.” The first sub-section presents an
optimistic “best-case scenario” in which the reform process is dismantling the worst
aspects of Myanmar’s previous regime. The second sub-section presents an alternative
critical political economy analysis, divided into three parts. The first emphasises the top-
down, military-managed nature of the transition and the broad constraints this places on
the reform process. The second examines the ways in which “emerging political com-
plexes” and crony capitalism, explored above, are also constraining and influencing the
reform trajectory. The third part explores whether Myanmar is likely to tread a similar
path to Cambodia, finding mixed evidence. The argument is that, even assuming that the
reformist thrust is genuine, there are sound reasons to expect it to be heavily constrained
and contested. One does not need to believe the more conspiratorial perspective of some
exile groups and Western activists – which sees SPDC Senior General Than Shwe as still
“pulling the strings,” or current President Thein Sein as a con artist merely seeking a
veneer of international legitimacy – in order to have cause for concern.
The Best-case Scenario
Following a rapid, unexpected series of reforms during 2011–12, understandably, there is
now considerable optimism in some quarters about Myanmar’s transition to market
democracy. This is grounded in three interrelated claims: that “hard-liners” have been
marginalised, making the transition irreversible; that more democratic institutions favour a
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dispersal of power and empower reformers; and that economic reforms are side-lining
Myanmar’s crony capitalists. These arguments are rarely unqualified by warnings of
potential setbacks, but they are presented here simply to provide a heuristic “best-case”
scenario.
Optimists convincingly argue that the transition is unlikely to be suddenly reversed by
“hard-liners.” First, the reform process is not simply driven by the new president, ex-
general Thein Sein, but apparently commands significant consensus among major power-
holders. Second, the momentum behind reform, including popular enthusiasm, would
make it difficult to reverse. Third, although some stand to lose out from reform, no
cohesive bloc of “hard-liners” has yet emerged. “Spoilers” may resist specific changes but
are unlikely entirely to overturn the reform agenda (ICG 2012b, 10–11).
Optimists also suggest that democratisation favours liberalisation by dispersing deci-
sion-making authority and empowering reformers. Reform is being superintended by ex-
military officers who now comprise Myanmar’s “civilian” administration, suggesting that
a reformist faction existed under the SPDC. Previously cowed or controlled, it has now
been unleashed to pursue its agenda (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 201–202, 209).
Democratisation has also dispersed authority to four power centres – the presidency,
parliament, the USDP, and the military. The president, seen as genuinely reform-minded,
has assembled policy networks granting reformists unprecedented access to state power,
notably his advisory committees and councils, which even contain a few formerly-exiled
political opponents. Thein Sein has also consulted smaller opposition parties and Aung
San Suu Kyi. Parliament, led by ex-general Shwe Mann as speaker, has also exhibited
reformist tendencies, passing liberalising laws, voting without party discipline, and
debating surprisingly freely. The presidency and parliament are said to be vying for the
mantle of reform (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 206, 210; ICG 2012b, 3–4, 11). Thein Sein
also ensured that the by-elections in 2012 were free and fair, facilitating the election of 47
NLD MPs. Under similar conditions, the NLD would win the 2015 general elections by a
landslide. Apparently to forestall this, Thein Sein’s administration has adopted the refor-
mist language of its erstwhile opponents, seeking to deliver tangible benefits to the
populace. This has generated glowing assessments that “the government is beholden to
no one” (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 209), and is “putting a priority on the view of the public
and ... the well-being of the population as a whole” (ICG 2012b, 6).
This optimistic view extends to economic reform. Institutionally and politically, Thein
Sein has apparently tilted away from the “cronies” and towards the Small and Medium
Enterprise (SME) sector. Two former UMFCCI presidents were appointed minister and
deputy minister of commerce and UMFCCI members are now regularly consulted on
economic policy, including through membership of cabinet sub-committees (interview
with Zaw Win Min and Khine Khine Nwe, Vice-President and Joint General-Secretary of
UMFCCI, July 13, 2012, Yangon; Larkin 2012, 21). The government states that SMEs are
central to its economic strategy and has encouraged the formation of around 100 “public
companies” through which they can pool resources to compete with larger firms (inter-
view with Zaw Win Min and Khine Khine Nwe, July 13, 2012). From this perspective,
the era of cronyism has ended. A joint general-secretary of UMFCCI declares that “the era
of rent-seeking business is over” because the government has made commitments against
monopolies, decision making is now dispersed and, given new media freedoms, any
patronage dispensed to cronies would be reported and generate backlash, including in
parliament (interview with Moe Kyaw, Joint General-Secretary, UMFCCI, July 7, 2012,
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Yangon). Larkin (2012) outlines an optimistic scenario whereby cronies abandon rent-
seeking to become hubs of “rapid industrialisation” by mediating foreign investment and
SME supply chains. He suggests that they will self-interestedly pressure their patrons to
uphold the rule of law and create a clean, predictable business environment. A major
report from the ADB (2012) paints an even rosier picture of Myanmar’s prospects,
declining even to mention crony capitalism and devoting just one paragraph to the risk
of “political conflict” in the borderlands.
A number of credible observers, ranging from international NGOs and development
institutions to local analysts and business elites, advance a quite optimistic assessment of
Myanmar’s reform trajectory. To the extent that they take account of the political economy
relations explored above, they imply that reform is relatively unencumbered by and even
rapidly dissolving them. The following sub-section offers a more sceptical view.
A Critical Political Economy Perspective
Amidst growing optimism over the reform process, it is worth reminding ourselves of why
pessimism reigned prior to mid-2011. Because the reform trajectory was initiated as a top-
down process, the balance of socio-political forces has not radically changed, as would be
the case in a revolutionary context. Those groups which became dominant under military
rule retain considerable power while those disorganised and weakened by the regime
remain disadvantaged in important ways. In particular, the military has been left “holding
the ring,” placing broad constraints on the reform process. Within these broad contours,
the reform process is arguably being shaped by struggles between various factions
spanning state and society, fought out and accommodated across different state appara-
tuses. This is the case, for example, in Vietnam, where reformist and conservative
coalitions, embedded in different parts of the state and economy, battle for control over
the country’s transition to state capitalism (Dixon and Kilgour 2002). In Myanmar, these
struggles are being shaped by the legacy of political complexes and ceasefire capitalism in
the borderlands, and the power of business oligarchs.
A managed transition: the military and the contours of reform. Crucially, the military
regime initiated democratisation from a position of relative strength, not weakness,
enabling it to secure a dispensation where it could set the broad contours of reform.
Although the exact trajectory will depend on struggles between different factions, the
reform process is unlikely to stray beyond certain “red lines” defined by the interests of
the military and its allies.
Despite various predictions that the junta would collapse, be overthrown, or brought to
heel by international sanctions, the military regime not only remained in power but
strengthened over time whilst forcibly disorganising those opponents it could not co-
opt. The army’s size more than doubled to greater than 400,000 from 1988–2007, and
arms imports exceeded US$2 billion despite the Western arms embargo. This produced
persistent trade and budget deficits – financed by printing money, thereby passing the cost
on to the population via inflation. However, these were reversed by the early 2000s thanks
to booming gas exports exceeding US$2 billion a year. The regime had practically
eviscerated the NLD via repeated crackdowns, prompting mass defections and the closure
of all party offices outside Yangon. Other popular forces, including the ‘88 Generation of
Students, were also forcibly disorganised. Decades of harsh repression created pervasive
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fear, demobilising the masses, who increasingly took refuge in mysticism. In 2007, rising
living costs brought perhaps 100,000 Buddhist monks on to the streets of major cities, but
most people remained passive and the protests were easily dispersed by force. Key groups
underpinning the regime – bureaucrats, the army, business and ethnic minority elites – did
not defect from the power bloc. Nor was Western pressure effective. As one senior
government figure comments, “sanctions did not paralyse us. We could continue ... for
a long time even if Western countries did not lift sanctions. We could crack down on any
domestic protests” (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 204). Any belief that the regime was some-
how “forced” to surrender power through a democratic transition – a view current among
some Western governments – is clearly deeply misguided.
Instead, the 2010 elections must be seen as the culmination of a top-down, managed
transition to “discipline-flourishing democracy.” As noted above, the regime held the NC
from 1993–96. SLORC’s goal was to persuade the delegates to accept a constitution in
which the military’s interests, security and political role would be guaranteed, which was
seen as necessary to prevent Myanmar’s disintegration in the face of separatist insurgen-
cies. This would be achieved through reserving 25% of parliamentary seats for military
representatives, creating a de facto veto on constitutional changes, ensuring the president
had a military background, and granting an autonomous military commander-in-chief the
authority to take power should the state’s sovereignty be threatened. Resistance by the
NLD and ethnic minorities led to the NC being abandoned in 1996. However, after
announcing a seven-step “roadmap to democracy” in 2003, the regime reconvened the
NC from 2004–07. A virtually identical constitution to the one offered in 1996 was
approved, then adopted via the 2008 referendum. The regime’s confidence in imposing
its preferred system at this point reflected its success since the mid-1990s in weakening
some opponents, and co-opting others via patronage and the “limited access order.” The
opposition parties that stood in elections in 2010 and 2011 were essentially pushed into
participating in a system they had no part in designing.
The implication of this top-down transition is that the military, as Myanmar’s dominant
political force, has set the basic contours for the subsequent “reform” process. The
military is left “holding the ring” in the new political dispensation, with a quarter of
parliamentary seats, a supra-political National Defence and Security Council which meets
thrice weekly to discuss all affairs of states, and the constitutional authority to retake
power. The desire to avoid this scenario constrains all political actors to operate within
bounds acceptable to the military. Senior General Than Shwe allegedly hand-picked the
new president, cabinet, parliamentary speaker, and other key individuals, almost 90% of
whom were ex-military. He thereby ensured a distribution of posts and power reflecting
the armed forces’ different factions. The cabinet is thus reportedly split between 30%
favouring swift reform and 30% who are cautious gradualists, presumably leaving 40%
who are conservatives (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 208–209). Subsequent cabinet reshuffles
and the appointment of a new vice-president suggest that this rough balance of forces has
been durably predetermined. Repeated rumours that President Thein Sein would promote
many liberalisers, heralding a rapid acceleration of reform, have been consistently con-
founded: the basic balance of power has remained relatively static. Furthermore, following
the election of 47 NLD MPs, more hard-line military representatives were appointed to
parliament, apparently to balance them out (ALTSEAN-Burma 2012, 19). From this
perspective, the issue is not whether the transition is reversible. Reversal is threatened
only if the “reform” process strays beyond acceptable limits. Recent changes have not
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happened despite military reluctance because of an upsurge in democratic decision
making, but because different factions are being carefully accommodated within a rela-
tively moderate reform programme.
For now, this clearly constrains political possibilities in various ways. There can, for
example, be no realistic prospect of holding leading officers to account for the human
rights abuses of the last two decades. NLD comments on possible Nuremberg-style
tribunals are thought to have helped dissuade the military from ceding power after the
1990 elections. Today’s reformers are likely to be more pragmatic. Similarly, any thor-
ough probe into the wealth amassed by senior generals and their corporate allies could be
profoundly destabilising. Conversely, in fact, they are receiving more resources under the
new dispensation: the military budget was increased 57% from 2011–12, to 14.4% of total
government expenditure (ALTSEAN-Burma 2012, 31). As one member of Thein Sein’s
Social and Economic Advisory Council remarks, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is inspiring, but Myanmar is ready only for reconciliation – not truth (inter-
view July 18, 2012, Yangon). This implies that the crime and plunder of the last two
decades may go largely unpunished, perpetuating a culture of impunity. This was largely
the case in post-Suharto Indonesia. There, democratic transition happened in a rapid,
shambolic fashion as the New Order power bloc quickly disintegrated following the Asian
financial crisis. Still, very few regime figures or cronies were ever prosecuted, and many
maintained considerable wealth and power. This outcome is even more likely in
Myanmar’s transition, where ancien régime forces remain largely intact, “holding the
ring” of the new system.
Political complexes and crony capitalism: an enduring legacy. Within these broad
contours, the month-by-month progress of reform is being shaped by struggles between
social forces located within and outside the state apparatus. Although reformers may be
cultivating a supportive coalition, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie, they face
formidable challenges given the power relations inherited from military rule. The forces
made dominant under the SPDC retain considerable influence to either undermine reform
or steer it in their own interests.
Regional army commanders and other elements of the borderlands’ “emerging political
complexes” remain the principal power-brokers in Myanmar’s minority states. Given that
the threat of Myanmar’s disintegration has repeatedly prompted military intervention in
politics, the army is likely to continue to shape profoundly the central government’s
approach to the borderlands. Although the SPDC’s strategy diminished this threat, armed
conflict continues in Kachin and Karen states, where regional commanders have twice
disobeyed executive ceasefire orders. Five ceasefires concluded elsewhere also remain
fragile. A state of emergency was also declared in Rakhine state following communal
violence between Muslims and Buddhists in June 2012, implying effective martial law.4
Reflecting the army’s central role in the borderlands, ethnic-minority leaders complain
that “political liberalisation undertaken by the new administration has not yet affected
areas under their control” (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 213). In many areas, the state also
relies heavily on the co-operation of authoritarian ceasefire group leaders; how far they are
willing to implement reforms that threaten their interests remains to be seen. Reforms may
be selectively embraced in ways that favour dominant groups. The Irrawaddy (May 15,
2012) reports, for example, that “land theft appears to be increasing as state agencies and
powerfully placed domestic firms position themselves to welcome foreign investment,”
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including those linked to the military, top crony capitalists and Chinese investors. All this
suggests that reformers in Nay Pyi Taw have only a weak grip over affairs in the
borderlands and that de facto power remains with the forces involved in “emerging
political complexes.”
The forces with which reformers are compelled to partner when pursuing durable peace
and reconciliation in the borderlands also reflect prevailing distributions of wealth and
power. To bypass unreliable army and state personnel, Thein Sein has principally used his
reformist minister of railways, Aung Min, to spearhead talks with minority groups.
However, he was also forced to work through Aung Thang, a highly conservative ex-
general and former industry minister who had cultivated major cronies – including his
own sons – operating in the borderlands, and who became head of the parliamentary
Union Level Peace Committee following his election as a USDP MP (Irrawaddy, May 11,
2012). Aung Thang was sidelined in May 2012, but Thein Sein himself has been forced to
assume leadership of the central Committee, illustrating the shortage of committed
reformers. Regional army commanders meanwhile sit on the various working committees,
confirming their continued centrality. The president has also relied directly on crony
businesspeople to facilitate peace negotiations. The Dawei Princess Company has facili-
tated and bankrolled talks with the Karen National Union; it has substantial mining and
logging interests in areas they control, and is involved in a US$60 billion Thai-backed
infrastructure project spanning Karen territory. Similarly, Yup Zaw Hkawng of Jadeland
Co., a major Kachin logging and jade-mining firm, has facilitated talks with the KIO (ICG
2012a, 16). These businesses – which partly comprise the “political complexes” in their
areas – clearly wish to restore stability favourable to their commercial interests.
Consequently, even if the reformers successfully pacify the borderlands, they may scar-
cely alter power relations on the ground.
This point is a useful reminder that struggles over the reform process occur not just at
the level of policy making but also policy implementation. This is true even in Nay Pyi
Taw, let alone the borderlands. Key ministries, like Industry II and Myanmar Industrial
Development, which operate rent-seeking SEEs, “can be expected to offer stiff resistance
to reforms.” Even when new laws are enacted they must “be interpreted by numerous
ministries and government departments who will add their own layers of rules and
regulations ... [This may generate] even more rent seeking as ‘exemptions’ granted by
officials become even more necessary for business survival” (Larkin 2012, 43, 45–46,
58). Furthermore, years of political purges, inadequate funding and endemic corruption
have produced a generally weak and inept bureaucracy heavily susceptible to influence by
powerful non-state actors. As the ICG (2012a, 7; 2012b, 11–12) notes, the formal process
of reform – the issuing of new laws and regulations – is now running well ahead of the
reformers’ practical capacity to implement them through the state apparatus.
The likelihood of corruption undermining reform is intensified by the fact that a
cronyist business elite, fostered by earlier state practices, now span the state and the
economy. Prior to the 2010 elections, the regime recruited around 100 cronies to run as
USDP candidates; many are now ensconced in parliament (Newsweek, November 15,
2010). In borderlands areas, local militia-commanders-turned-businessmen and drugs
barons have been elected under the USDP banner (TNI 2011, 75; Meehan 2011, 398).
Unsurprisingly, given the lack of alternative sources of finance, other parties also depend
on business funding. The largest opposition party to participate in 2010 – the National
Democratic Force (NDF), an NLD splinter group – was bankrolled by fisheries magnate
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Hla Maung Shwe, vice-president of business-led NGO Myanmar Egress. The resulting
controversy over “crony funds” split the opposition alliance (Mizzima, October 14, 2010).
The NLD’s 2012 by-election campaign was also reportedly financed by business
contributions.
Unsurprisingly, the legislative progress of reform has reflected this political economy
context, involving struggles between different economic interests. Reflecting struggles in
the borderlands, debates over new land laws “pitt[ed] businessmen-cum-politicians with
vested interests in agribusiness, led by the newly-elected MP Htay Myint of Yuzana
Company with his oil palm monopoly, against a handful of leaders representing ethnic
political parties” (TNI 2011, 33). According to the Asian Human Rights Commission
(2012), the resultant Farmland Act, which empowers state agencies to allocate land and
facilitates long private leases, enables “an epidemic of land grabbing.” Myanmar risks
“going down the path of Cambodia, where land grabbing is so rife and the political and
economic systems so heavily bound up in the state-sponsored theft of land that it is too
late for the international community to do anything effective to stop it.” Protracted
struggles also occurred over the Foreign Investment Bill. Responding to business lobby-
ing, lower-house MPs inserted numerous clauses to protect domestic businesses from
competition and funnel foreign investment into minority joint ventures with established
local firms (Reuters, August 29, 2012). The president vetoed the bill and an amended
version was passed in November 2012 which superficially conceded most points.
However, it retained very ambiguous language and various concessions must now be
interpreted through enabling regulations issued by ministries, which creates a further
access point for business lobbying. Reflecting on such developments, the ICG (2012a,
11) concedes that “Myanmar will not be immune to the region’s money politics.” Indeed,
amidst this inter-elite rivalry, the smaller, pro-democracy parties are largely marginalised.
All 56 bills proposed by the NDF, for example, have been rejected (ALTSEAN-Burma
2012, 16).
Struggles over the reform process also take the form of constitutional wrangling.
Executive-based reformers have tried to insulate their agenda from conservatives by
limiting parliament’s role. For example, the presidency secured a constitutional court
ruling that only it could initiate legislation. Parliament fought back by creating committees
to scrutinise the executive and voting to impeach all members of the constitutional court,
precipitating their resignation. Given the political economy context that lies behind these
struggles, one should not necessarily suppose that parliament asserting itself against the
executive by talking up “democracy” means that “the positions of liberal officials [are
being] consolidated” (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 210). Democratisation need not yield
liberalisation: it depends on the social forces to which it gives vent. As we have seen in
other late-developing countries, including elsewhere in Southeast Asia, these forces are
frequently illiberal.
Importantly, the continued influence of an illiberal business class does not simply stem
from instrumental control of parliamentary seats, which could change at the next election,
but their structural dominance in the economy. The state remains reliant on business for
large parts of its revenue, the operation of extractive industries and, as we have seen, some
aspects of policy implementation. The leading cronies, in particular, are so dominant in
terms of market share, access to capital and human resources that their co-operation is
seen as vital for Myanmar’s economic growth. As the head of one business association
remarks, “Myanmar needs some cronies. Myanmar is fifty years closed ... so only cronies
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got the chance. Their money, their effort is needed by the country” (interview with Wah
Wah Tun, President, Myanmar Women’s Entrepreneurial Association, July 26, 2012,
Yangon). Four leading cronies – Tay Za, Win Aung, Aung Ko Win and Nay Aung –
joined Thein Sein’s business delegation to Japan in April 2012, reflecting the crony-
conglomerates’ continued economic centrality as the only firms large enough to conduct
business internationally. Even in Larkin’s (2012, 46) most optimistic scenario, the coun-
try’s top conglomerates are assigned a “pivotal role” in leading SME development and
mediating foreign investment.
The structural dominance of big business will likely secure the tycoons’ continued
political influence regardless of parliamentary personalities and, as with the military, this
will impose broad limits on the progress of reform. As Larkin (2012, 46) concedes, the
owners of leading conglomerates “are important enough to secure access to the power
salons of Nay Pyi Taw under almost all scenarios.” They may not enjoy close relations
with Thein Sein, but they have cultivated close relations with other ex-military figures and
sector-specific ministries over many years. As the wrangling over the Foreign Investment
Bill showed, business can influence MPs from outside parliament. The NDF imbroglio
illustrates the impoverished political parties’ reliance on business funding. Their structural
position is such that any serious attempt to probe the origins of cronies’ wealth or to
dismantle their private monopolies and cartels, still less to expropriate their ill-gotten
gains, would generate considerable economic disruption that could trigger social unrest.
For example, criminal proceeds are so intermeshed with the country’s financial system
that any real effort to tackle money-laundering would probably precipitate the collapse of
the banking system, seriously damaging the wider economy. Thein Sein may have tilted
away from the cronies, but he cannot move seriously against their interests without
building a much stronger countervailing coalition of forces than he currently commands.
For now, rather than straightforwardly being undermined by the reform process, big
business is in prime position to gain from it. Cronies and military-linked firms were the
prime beneficiaries of a rush of privatisations during 2009–11 which converted state
monopolies like ports and petroleum distribution into private monopolies or cartels
(ALTSEAN-Burma 2011, 2–4). As we have already seen in relation to land and foreign
investment, large-scale businesses have promoted sector-specific liberalisations from
which they themselves stand to gain, whilst trying to limit liberalisation that harms their
interests. Even when liberalisation is apparently “above board,” the cronies’ financial
position means they are best-placed to benefit. For example, when the insurance industry
was liberalised, the capital requirements shut out 20 smaller firms but the 12 approved
licensees included subsidiaries of leading crony-conglomerates including those of Tay Za,
Zaw Zaw and Steven Law (Irrawaddy, September 7, 2012). As UMFCCI’s vice-president
remarks, although everyone may now be free to bid for government contracts and
licences, “the cronies still have advantages: financially, they are very strong; the new-
comers, they are not” (interview with Zaw Win Min and Khine Khine Nwe, July 13,
2012). Those with established networks inside the state apparatus also retain a consider-
able advantage given that business permits and licences are still largely obtained through
personal contacts (ICG 2012a, 5–6). Cronies have exploited such contacts to enter the
media industry: Tay Za now owns two weekly newspapers, whilst Kyaw Win has
established Myanmar’s second-only private television service, Skynet (interview with
Thiha Saw, Editor, Myanmar Dana, July 24, 2012, Yangon). The situation is similar
with regard to financial services. Of four private banks newly-licensed to handle overseas
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remittances, three belong to leading cronies: Tay Za’s Asia Green Development Bank,
Aung Ko Win’s Kanbawza Bank, and Zaw Zaw’s Ayeyawady Bank (New Light of
Myanmar, January 31, 2012). The cronies’ size, resources and connections also position
them to partner with foreign firms as the country admits more foreign investment. For
example, Japan’s 7-Eleven has signed a deal with Zaykabar Company, owned by crony
businessman and USDP MP Khin Shwe, to open convenience stores, whilst Singapore’s
Aussino Group has partnered with Zaw Zaw to run privatised petrol stations (Mizzima,
June 12, 2012; Reuters, June 19, 2012).
Naturally, gaining from liberalisation requires adjustments of strategy, and there will
doubtless be some winners and losers. Some of the old methods by which cronies
prospered have been dismantled by reformers and others may be politically unfeasible.
For example, the abolition of the military-dominated Trade Policy Council and associated
trade permits has terminated the scam of obtaining scarce import licences and re-selling
imported goods at massively inflated prices. Although cronies were still receiving big
construction contracts in 2010 and privatised state assets well into 2011, future deals may
be more even-handed. The point is not that “business as usual” prevails, but that earlier
regime strategies have created state-linked business empires that, with adjustments of
approach, can remain dominant and even be boosted by “reform.” On the evidence so far,
it seems misguided to think that Myanmar’s tycoons will not use their wealth and
connections to secure advantages against rivals and instead promote equal competition
and the rule of law. This scenario is based on notions of capitalist interests and strategy
that seem idealised even in a Western context. Furthermore, this has not occurred any-
where else in Southeast Asia.5
It has alternatively been suggested that parliamentary or media outcry against any “rent-
seeking” will force crony capitalists and state authorities to change. Given the influence of
business and the weakness of opposition parties in parliament, the former seems ques-
tionable. As for the media, censorship has eased somewhat, and a new Media Law is
being drafted with journalists’ input. However, considerable legal restrictions on press
freedom remain. For example, two weekly journals’ licences to publish were suspended in
June 2011 after exposing government corruption, and their editor is now being sued for
defamation (Asian Correspondent, September 20, 2012). In June 2012, another journal’s
licence was suspended and its editor arrested on serious charges, including sedition, for
publishing photographs which had sparked unrest in Arakan state; he was released only
after a bail payment of 400 million kyats (US$460,000), a colossal sum for a small media
firm (Myanmar Times, July 2–8, 2012). Similarly, opposition politicians who accuse
government officials of corruption have found themselves prosecuted for defamation
and incitement (Irrawaddy, November 23, 2012). Such cases encourage self-censorship
and create a widespread chilling effect. Moreover, even without state censorship, patterns
of ownership and control determine the media’s practical freedom. As one financial
magazine editor observes, “cronies have begun to creep into the market” and smaller
operators cannot compete with them financially or in terms of their ability to acquire
licences. Cronies may even be willing to run media at a loss: “this is not about money, it is
about media influence ... Now it can be freer, the media may have a lot of influence on
government, business, politics, so they must have a foothold in this sector” (interview
with Thiha Saw, July 24, 2012). Rather than opposing rent-seeking in general, media –
and perhaps parliamentary – debates may instead express struggles over the spoils of
reform. While some tycoons and market liberalisations have been attacked in the press,
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according to a leading economist and former senior government official, “even those who
are attacking the cronies are themselves cronies.” (interview with Khin Maung Nyo, July
11, 2012) For example, Eleven Media Group has attacked Skynet’s television monopoly,
yet also criticised the liberalisation of car imports. This inconsistency is due to Eleven’s
desire to expand its media market share, whilst defending the group’s other interests in
vehicle sales. The complex business interests behind Myanmar’s handful of leading media
groups may make the press a fickle watchdog of market liberalism.
From a critical political economy perspective, then, optimistic assessments of
Myanmar’s reform trajectory are cast into doubt. The forces and power relations estab-
lished through the military regime’s political and economic strategies remain in play and
are already shaping the new dispensation. This influence is now mediated differently due
to institutional change, compelling some dominant groups to change strategy. Cronies, in
particular, are having to re-organise themselves through parliament, adopt techniques of
“money politics,” and reposition their businesses for a somewhat more competitive
environment. Yet, they are also seeking – in some cases quite successfully – to shape
the reform trajectory in their own interests. The pace and extent of reform is being
determined by their ongoing struggles with the reformers, within, across and outside
state apparatuses.
A Cambodian Future?
Finally, we turn to investigate the possibility that Myanmar’s trajectory could be similar to
that of post-communist Cambodia. This is necessarily a highly speculative analysis since
much is contingent upon ongoing, dimly-understood processes. Cambodia and Myanmar
have commonalities, notably their state-managed transition to capitalism and democracy, a
dominant party partly intermeshed with state apparatuses, a partial fusion between busi-
ness and political elites, and natural resources at the centre of their economies. However,
whilst Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has successfully built a dominant-party
system that has essentially defeated all challengers, this process is far from complete in
Myanmar, providing some reasons for hope. The outcome will be contingent on future
social conflict, and there is the potential for a more progressive coalition to be formed. Yet
formidable barriers emanate from the structural power relations inherited from the past,
the weaknesses of opposition forces and strategies, and international practices.
Cambodia’s post-communist trajectory has seen the consolidation of a dominant party
system, in which the CPP enjoys unrivalled power, under conditions comparable to
Myanmar’s. In the 1980s, Cambodia was similarly boycotted and isolated by Western
powers and, in response to cuts in Soviet aid in 1986, the government pursued a state-
managed transition to capitalism. This involved privatising state assets into the hands of
state cadres and their allies, and the patronage networks thereby established became the
basis for the CPP (Hughes 2003). In 1993, a UN state-building intervention implemented
a political settlement to Cambodia’s long-running civil war and oversaw a transition to
electoral democracy. The CPP did not win the elections outright but was forced to govern
in coalition with FUNCINPEC, a Western-backed guerrilla-movement-cum-party led by
the son of Cambodia’s restored monarch, Sihanouk. However, the CPP enjoyed structural
advantages through its interpenetration with the bureaucracy and army, its business
interests, and, via the state, ample patronage resources and coercive capacities.
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The CPP swiftly dominated rural areas, dispensing development projects to buy local
support, co-opting headmen and coercing opponents. Nationally, the CPP used
Cambodia’s natural resources, particularly its forests, to construct a vast patronage net-
work spanning the party and state apparatus (Global Witness 2007). Notwithstanding a
major political crisis from 1997–99, which saw foreign aid suspended and serious
international pressure on the CPP, FUNCINPEC was gradually outmanoeuvred.
Repeated splits and defections reduced it to a negligible electoral force. Today’s main
opposition Sam Rainsy Party – which maintains strong support in urban areas, where CPP
methods are less effective – is persistently harassed by state agencies. Its leader has been
repeatedly prosecuted by the highly corrupt judicial system, forcing him into near-
permanent exile. The CPP’s rural dominance now secures it a large majority of parlia-
mentary seats, permitting it to rule alone and exercise total hegemony over the state. All
this was accomplished within formally democratic institutions, and amidst two decades of
“good governance” programmes and aid from international donors.
Myanmar’s structural similarities with Cambodia make possible a similar, albeit not
identical, trajectory. A state-managed transition to capitalism has concentrated significant
economic power in the hands of state-linked interests. The USDP exhibits a fusion of
political, state and business power and, thanks to the rigged 2010 elections, is the
dominant party in both chambers of the national parliament and all but one of the regional
assemblies. Unlike the CPP, it does not need a coalition partner and is unencumbered by a
Western state-building intervention. The USDP’s relationship is even closer to the army
than the CPP given its large ex-military membership. The USDP itself commands sub-
stantial business interests, as do many of its members, providing a potential patronage
base. This could be enhanced through the use of government permits and licences,
particularly for the exploitation of Myanmar’s plentiful natural resources. USDP candi-
dates have rallied voters through promises of local development spending, and parlia-
mentary questions to ministers are dominated by funding requests for local projects,
suggesting a strategy of pork and patronage. Much of this suggests that the USDP
could replicate the CPP’s exploits.
However, several important factors specific to Myanmar make this task far from
straightforward. First, whereas the military, the cronies and their proxies are widely
despised, Aung San Suu Kyi enjoys tremendous popularity. In the 2012 by-elections,
the NLD swept the board with two-thirds of the vote, while the USDP won just 27%. If
this was replicated in 2015, the USDP would lose office. However, this outcome is
uncertain. FUNCINPEC enjoyed widespread support thanks to the Cambodian peasantry’s
reverence for Sihanouk, yet it was still outmanoeuvred. More importantly, we cannot be
sure that the conditions surrounding the 2012 by-election will be repeated in 2015. The
by-election was deliberately manufactured by Thein Sein to create an opportunity to bring
the NLD inside the system and encourage Western countries to lift sanctions. To enable
this, the USDP and its state allies were restrained from using the strategies of patronage
and coercion they deployed in 2010. USDP elites seem unlikely to commit collective
political suicide by replicating this in 2015. It is also unclear whether the army would
tolerate an NLD government with a large majority taking office. If dominant forces return
their earlier strategies, the NLD’s victory is not assured. Even if the NLD wins, it will still
confront a military bloc in parliament and other conservative forces within and beyond the
state apparatus.
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As reformists will emphasise in their struggle to ensure a clean election in 2015, serious
electoral malfeasance risks a Western backlash. By then, however, Western economic
interests in Myanmar may preclude a return to sanctions and isolation. In any case,
appetite for this policy had waned considerably even prior to the 2010 elections. NDF
leaders were persuaded to participate in those polls because a US diplomat informed them
that, even if they were not free and fair, Washington would none the less recognise and
work with the resultant government within six months (interview with Khin Maung Swe,
NDF chair, July 4, 2012, Yangon). Notably, aside from 1997–99, Western donors have
remained engaged in Cambodia throughout CPP rule, fully aware of the highly corrupt
and authoritarian style of Hun Sen’s administration, yet vainly hoping for change.
Another factor which may see Myanmar avoid Cambodia’s trajectory is that USDP
leaders may not be creating an effective party machine. This is critical because structural
factors only condition possibilities; it takes human agency and struggle to determine
outcomes. Dominant parties do not build themselves. The generals’ quest to insulate the
state from party politics, which they see as inherently unruly and centrifugal, has created a
constitution which separates both executive and legislative power and the executive from
political parties. Consequently, no executive officers may legally participate in “party
activities.” This is unlike Cambodia, where legislative, executive and party power are all
controlled by Hun Sen, permitting the fashioning of a coherent power bloc. Of course,
Thein Sein (who formally remains the USDP chair) might have helped build the USDP
machine behind the scenes, ignoring official rules. Rather than becoming a party-based
strongman, however, he has indicated his intention to step down in 2015 (due to his poor
health), and has apparently devoted little effort to party-building. Contrariwise, given his
tilt towards the reformists, he has struggled to assert the “de-politicised” executive’s
supremacy over parliament and, by extension, the USDP. The counter-positioning of
parliamentary speaker Shwe Mann – who is the USDP’s acting chair – may reflect
moves to succeed Thein Sein using the party as a powerbase. However, he and other
leaders lack experience of machine politics and whether they are actually providing
adequate strategic leadership is unclear. Far more research is required on this question.
More optimistic analysts suggest that the USDP has been “sidelined,” reporting that its
oligarchs are unwilling to finance the creation of a “political empire” (ICG 2012a, 13). If
this is true, the USDP seems unlikely to survive as a dominant party, and Myanmar’s
trajectory may be closer to post-Suharto Indonesia, where Golkar lost its pre-eminent
position and jostled for position with several parties. Importantly, this did not mean that
the oligarchic elite cultivated under Suharto simply vanished. Rather, their once cohesive
bloc fragmented and different parties became “Trojan horses” for various oligarchic
factions (Tan 2006). This is a reminder that any government in Myanmar – including
one led by the NLD – will face similar structural constraints emanating from the political
economy. Interestingly, some cronies appear to be hedging their bets ahead of 2015 by
rehabilitating their public image through philanthropy and cultivating closer relations with
Aung San Suu Kyi, with businesses even bankrolling the NLD’s by-election campaign
(ICG 2012a, 10). The spectre of “money politics” will remain even if the USDP flounders.
From a Gramscian perspective, moderating the influence of dominant forces and
pursuing more progressive policies would involve constructing a broader or counter-
vailing socio-political coalition; but there are formidable barriers to doing this in
Myanmar. The prospective constituents of a more “pro-poor” coalition might include
militant monks, landless and small farmers battling land grabs, and urban workers, some
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of whom have recently formed over 180 unions and won significant pay increases.
Unfortunately, the legacy of decades of BSPP and military rule is that, as elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, such popular forces have been systematically disorganised and weakened.
A tiny handful of activists have only just begun to organise farmers against land grabs.
The brutal suppression of a three-month occupation of the Monya mine (a joint venture
between the military-owned Myanmar Economic Holdings and Chinese investors) in
November 2012 was a stark indication of the challenges they face (Al-Jazeera,
November 29, 2012). The leaders of solidarity protests in Rangoon were also charged
with “incitement to unrest,” one of many examples of new laws apparently “liberalising”
protest actually being used to curtail it (see ALTSEAN-Burma 2012, 18). Unions are in
their infancy and are highly fragmented, operating mostly at the enterprise level. Many
business-owners are hostile to organised labour, and state employers have dispersed
workers seeking to organise unions (Irrawaddy, November 30, 2012). Furthermore,
farmers and workers in what is Asia’s poorest country are typically preoccupied with
their daily survival and, being impoverished, have few resources necessary for effective
self-organisation.
Sadly, the NLD is doing little to help. One of its leaders, Win Tin, strongly criticised the
‘88 Generation of Students for working with unions, arguing this should be left to the
NLD – but the party has still done little on its own account. This reflects the NLD’s lack
of strategic thinking and any concrete policy platform, which itself stems from the
dominance of its rigid, centralist and gerontocratic central committee. These shortcomings
are not openly discussed because any criticism of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership is
considered beyond the pale. By constraining itself to statements of principle, the NLD
continues largely as a symbolic, elite opposition party – albeit one with a popular figure-
head – rather than the vanguard of a counter-hegemonic bloc driving a new agenda.
Although the ‘88 Generation is reportedly considering launching its own party, this
would, of course, further fragment the opposition.
Other barriers to pro-poor mobilisation stem from international factors. Many political
and civil society activists interviewed argue that, by constraining the country’s develop-
ment, Western sanctions intensified the struggle for survival, making it harder for
Myanmar’s poorest to participate in political struggle. Ironically, the sector hardest hit
by US sanctions was the private-sector garments industry, where labour militancy was
strongest; up to 340,000 urban workers lost their jobs, mostly returning to their villages,
emigrating or allegedly becoming sex workers (interview with Zaw Win Min and Khine
Khine Nwe, July 13, 2012). The foreign investment which did enter Myanmar, concen-
trated in the borderlands, empowered illiberal elites while fuelling land grabs and the
marginalisation of small farmers. Unless post-sanctions Western investment is moderated
by codes of conduct ensuring that local communities benefit (which seems unlikely), it
could well accelerate this tendency. A further risk is that Western development and “civil
society capacity building” interventions will, perhaps inadvertently, neuter emergent pro-
poor organisations. This occurred in Cambodia when the International Labour
Organisation directed garment workers’ unions to “professionalise” and adopt a “partner-
ship” approach towards employers and government instead of a politicised, militant one.
This effectively neutered the unions, depriving the opposition of a potentially vibrant
urban base (Hughes 2007).
Myanmar thus shares important characteristics with Cambodia that could see it follow-
ing a similar trajectory. The balance of social forces – arising from state-managed
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transitions to capitalism and democracy – is similar in both countries, creating the
structural conditions for a dominant-party system. However, at the level of political
struggle, several important factors apparently mitigate against this trajectory, providing
a more hopeful outlook. Yet key structural constraints, emanating from the political
economy and social power relations, will confront any government and hamper progres-
sive political organising. Shifting these constraints involves surmounting formidable
social, economic and political obstacles.
Conclusion
The primary goal of this article has been to survey key developments in Myanmar’s
political economy over the previous two decades and explore their implications for the
country’s current reform era. From a “Murdoch school” perspective, the structural con-
straints emanating from the political economy and wider social power relations, and the
struggles between social forces for power and control over resources, shape the extent of
“reform” and its actual implementation. In Myanmar, key structural constraints include the
continued power of the military, the politico-military-business nexuses of the borderlands’
“political complexes,” and state-facilitated crony capitalism. These power relations place
limits on both the formulation and implementation of reform. The forces implicated in
these relationships are also engaged in struggles with reformers over the direction and
pace of reform, seeking to steer it in their interests. These struggles are being played out
within, across and outside state apparatuses.
A secondary goal of the article was to emphasise changes in Myanmar’s political
economy rather than stagnation, and to situate its development within broader regional
trends. As in other Southeast Asian countries, the state has facilitated the emergence of a
significant “tycoon” class. The legacy of BSPP rule and the constraints of military
strategy mean this class is considerably weaker than most of its contemporary counter-
parts. Although crony capitalists have now entered the political field for the first time,
their longstanding dependence on the state has given them little experience of machine
politics and it remains to be seen whether they can consolidate an instrumental control of
the state. Another commonality, again stemming from both BSPP and military rule, is the
systematic weakness and disorganisation of other social forces, including labour, the
peasantry, minority groups and the middle class, making it difficult to challenge the
structural power of dominant forces.
Furthermore, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Myanmar’s mode of capitalist develop-
ment has been highly rapacious and coercive. Myanmar is essentially experiencing the
early phases of primitive accumulation. It is further “behind” in this respect than many
regional economies, and the process has perhaps been intensified by Western sanctions
which, by depriving the country of alternative development pathways, arguably drove the
state to grab whatever resources it could and embrace highly exploitative forms of foreign
investment. None the less, the land grabs and abuses associated with deforestation,
agribusiness, mining and infrastructure development are paralleled by similar events in
countries like Indonesia and Cambodia, and they are driven by similar forces: rising
demand for commodities and flows of foreign capital. Finally, that state power in
Myanmar primarily serves a narrow social constituency is more apparent than is the
case elsewhere. Unlike the region’s more advanced capitalist states, it has not yet devel-
oped party machines that at least deliver some benefits to subordinated groups and
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generate “performance legitimacy” for incumbent elites, let alone the sophisticated modes
of technocratic participation that deflect popular participation away from challenging
entrenched interests. Although this may change over time, for now, the threat or use of
coercion remains an important feature of governance. Myanmar may be transforming into
a more “normal” Southeast Asian state, and many will rightly see this as an improvement
on direct military dictatorship; but regional “normality” still implies many constraints on
truly emancipatory politics.
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Notes
1 On ethnicity in general, see Walton (2013).
2 This concept was first applied to Myanmar by Patrick Meehan (2011).
3 Two-thirds of Myanmar’s total foreign investment is concentrated in the resource-rich borderlands (TNI 2011,
12).
4 Lack of sympathy for and even racist hostility towards the long-persecuted Muslim “Rohingyas” is wide-
spread among ethnic Bamars, including among leading pro-democracy activists; Aung San Suu Kyi has also
declined to “take sides.” Although the issue is complex, these reactions remind us that even pro-democracy
forces may be illiberal.
5 Only Singapore’s economy exhibits robust “rule of law,” and this is due to the specific interests of state
capitalists, not the demands of private enterprise. I owe this point to Garry Rodan.
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